Posted: April 2nd, 2022

ESSAY EXAM- ARISTOTLE ON HUMAN NATURE essay

Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle

Adapted from a translation by W.D. Ross

BOOK I
THE HUMAN GOOD

CHAPTER 1
ACTIONS, PRODUCTS, AND GOALS
EVERY skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among goals; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are goals apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.
Now, since there are many actions, skills, and sciences, their goals also are many; the goal of the medical skill is health, that of shipbuilding a ship, that of strategy is victory, that of economics is wealth.
But sometimes such skills fall under a single capacity — e.g., bridle-making and the other skills concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the skill of horse-riding, and this skill and every military action fall under the skill of military strategy, etc. In all such cases, the goals of the master skills are to be preferred to all the subordinate goals; for it is for the sake of the master skill that the subordinate goals are pursued. […]
CHAPTER 2
If, then, there is some goal of the things we do which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this goal must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?
If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative skill and that which is most truly the master skill. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state [etc.]…
Now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the goal of this science must include those of the others, so that this goal must be the good for humans.
[…]
CHAPTER 4
WHAT IS THE HUMAN GOOD?
Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the average people and those of superior refinement say that it is happiness [living well/eudaimonia], and they identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness [living well] is they differ, and the masses do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another — and often even the same person identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. […]
CHAPTER 5 – CANDIDATES FOR HAPPINESS
[…] To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness [living well], with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life — that just mentioned [pleasure], the political, and thirdly the contemplative life.

Pleasure as the Highest Good?
Now the mass of mankind is evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts. But they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapalus [a king famous for his sensuous luxury].

Honor as the Highest Good?
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness [living well] with honor; for this is, roughly speaking, the goal of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honor rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a person and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honored, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.

Other Candidates for the Highest Good
And perhaps one might even suppose virtue to be, rather than honor, the goal of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a person who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions.

Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.
[…]
CHAPTER 7
THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVITY [ERGON] OF THE HUMAN
[…] Now we call that which is worthy of pursuit in itself more final than [i.e., superior to] that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else. […]
Now such a thing happiness [living well], above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness [living well], judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness [living well], on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
[…]
Presumably, however, to say that happiness [living well] is the chief good seems a platitude, and so we still need a clearer account of what it is. This might be given if we could first determine the essential activity [ergon] of the human. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have an essential activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to be in relation to the essential activity, so would it seem to be for the human, if he has an essential activity. […]
1.) Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking [as the ‘essential activity’ of the human] what is unique to the human. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. 2.) Next there would be a life of perception, but this also seems to be common even to the horse, the cow, and every animal. 3.) There remains, then, an active life of the part of the soul that has a rational principle [i.e., that has reason]; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to it, while the other has it in the sense of possessing it and exercising thought.

CHAPTER 13
THE PARTS OF THE HUMAN SOUL [MIND];
HUMAN VIRTUE [HUMAN EXCELLENCE]
Since happiness [living well] is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue [i.e., perfect excellence], we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness [living well]. The true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws.
[…] But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness [human living well].
By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul [i.e., the mind, broadly speaking]; and happiness [living well] also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body… […]

THE RATIONAL PART AND NON-RATIONAL PART OF THE SOUL
Some things adequate enough are said about the soul even in the discussions outside our own school, and we must use these; e.g. that one part in the soul is non-rational and one has a rational principle [i.e., has the faculty of reason itself].
[…]

THE VEGETATIVE PART OF THE SOUL
Of the non-rational part, one division seems to be widely distributed, and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to full-grown creatures; this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them.

Now the excellence of this part of the soul seems to be common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep… […] Let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.

THE DESIRING PART OF THE SOUL
There seems to be also another non-rational part in the soul – one which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle [shares in reason]. For we praise the rational principle [of the people who have an understanding of what is best to do], since it urges them correctly and towards the best things; but there is found in them also another part [the desiring/appetitive part] naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. For just as paralyzed limbs, when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent [un-self-controlled] people move in contrary directions.

[…] Now even this [the desiring part] seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man, it obeys the rational principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle.

Thus, the non-rational part of the soul also appears to be two-fold [the vegetative part, and the desiring part]. For the vegetative part in no way shares in a rational principle [in reason], but the appetitive and in general the desiring part in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it… […]

Virtue [Excellence] too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some of the virtues are of the intellect and others are of character – ‘philosophic wisdom’ and ‘understanding’ and ‘practical wisdom’ being virtues of intellect, and generosity and self-control being virtues of character. For in speaking about a person’s character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and the states of mind which deserve praise we call “virtues.”
BOOK II
VIRTUES OF CHARACTER
CHAPTER 1
VIRTUE, then, is of two kinds: of the intellect and of character. Virtues of intellect primarily owe both their birth and their growth to teaching (and thus it requires experience and time), while virtues of character come about as a result of habit… […]
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and harp players by playing the harp; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
[…]

BOOK VI
VIRTUES OF INTELLECT
CHAPTER 1
[…]
We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are virtues of character and others of intellect. Now we have discussed in detail the virtues of character; with regard to the others let us express our view as follows, beginning with some remarks about the soul.

We said before that there are two parts of the soul – that which grasps a rational principle, and the non-rational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle [within reason]. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle – one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originary causes are unchanging, and one by which we contemplate changing things. For where objects differ in kind, the part of the soul answering to each of the two is also different in kind, since it is because of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called the “scientific” and the other the “calculative.” For to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about what is unchanging. Therefore, the calculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle. We must, then, learn what is the best state of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each.
CHAPTER 3
[…]
Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Thus the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Thus it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable.
[…]

BOOK X
CHAPTER 6 – HAPPINESS (LIVING WELL)
[…] …what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of happiness [living well], since this is what we state the goal of human nature to be. Our discussion will be more concise if we first sum up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a disposition [a passive state]; for if it were it might belong to someone who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else. For happiness does not lack anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake.

Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature; we choose them not for the sake of other things; for we are injured rather than benefited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our property. But most of the people who are deemed happy take refuge in such pastimes, which is the reason why those who are ready-witted at them are highly esteemed at the courts of tyrants; they make themselves pleasant companions in the tyrants’ favorite pursuits, and that is the sort of human they want.
Now these things are thought to be of the nature of happiness because people in despotic [tyrannical] positions spend their leisure in them, but perhaps such people prove nothing; for virtue and reason, from which good activities flow, do not depend on despotic position; nor, if these people, who have never tasted pure and generous pleasure, take refuge in the bodily pleasures, should these for that reason be thought more desirable; for boys, too, think the things that are valued among themselves are the best. It is to be expected, then, that, as different things seem valuable to boys and to men, so they should to bad people and to good people.
Now, as we have often maintained, those things are both valuable and pleasant which are such to the good person; and to each human the activity in accordance with his own disposition is most desirable, and, therefore, to the good person that which is in accordance with virtue. Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement; it would, indeed, be strange if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one’s life in order to amuse oneself. For, in a word, everything that we choose we choose for the sake of something else – except happiness, which is a goal. Now to exert oneself and work for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity.

The happy life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life requires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. […]

Chapter 7 – The Contemplative Life is the Best Life
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.

Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what we said before and with the truth. For, firstly, this [contemplative] activity is the best (since not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects); and secondly, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything.
And we think happiness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities; at all events the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvelous for their purity and their enduringness, and it is to be expected that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire.
And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. For while a philosopher, as well as a just human or one possessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just human needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate person, the brave person, and each of the others is in the same case, but the philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient.
And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action.

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