Posted: January 31st, 2023

Do a Brief Case of State v. Toups. All the attachment is on the botttom

Do a Brief Case of State v. Toups. All the attachment is on the botttom

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BRIEFS CASES INSTRUCTION

Always put the U.S. Supreme Court in Caps e.g. The Court stated that. . .

The U.S. Supreme Court held that . . .

Only put the HOLDING (ruling) of the highest reviewing court.

This is the same for the REASONING sec±on of the brief.

Never, ever put what the jury, state, defense, or what a lower court argued in the
HOLDING or REASONING.

Make sure to put all your section headings e.g,
FACTS
in bold and caps.

When you are writing your FACTS section make sure to only include the key, material
information necessary for the highest reviewing court or the reader to understand the
legal question of the case. Generally these things are not needed in the FACTS:

Full names of parties; dates, cities; and detailed descriptions of statutes.

For example in Stanko I would only say:

State v. Stanko, 974 P.2D 1132 (MONT. 1998)

FACTS:

In Montana a statute made it illegal to drive at an unreasonable speed but did not list an
exact speed limit. Stanko was cited for going 85 miles per hour in a new car. The officer
stated that in his opinion the driver was going at an unsafe speed considering the
circumstances of the road etc.

ISSUE:

Is the Montana statute too vague to be enforceable because it does not list the actual
speed limit and gives full discretion to the police officers at the scene to determine if they
are driving to fast?

HOLDING:

Yes, the Montana speeding statute was too vague and did not clearly give drivers notice
of what was an illegal speed.

REASONING:

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
The key to the court’s ruling was that the statute was not enforceable because it was too
vague. And that it violates the void for vagueness doctrine.

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Samson v. California 537 U.S. 843 (2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers)
FACTS:
Samson was on parole in the State of California.
A condition of
parole in that state was the parolee’s agreement, in writing, to allow searches
and seizures by a parole officer, at any time, with or without a search
warrant and with or without cause.
A San Bruno police officer stopped
Samson on the street, knowing that Samson was on parole.
The officer also
believed that Samson had an outstanding parole warrant, which he denied
existed.
The officer confirmed, via the radio, that Samson was on parole and
that he had no outstanding warrants.
However, the officer searched Samson
based on his parole status.
The officer found a box in Samson’s breast
pocket that contained methamphetamine.
Samson’s motion to suppress this evidence was detained by the trial
court, saying it was justified by the California law allowing searches and the
determination that the search was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Samson
was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, stating that
the search was reasonable because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing.
ISSUE
Does a suspicionless search of a parolee by a police officer violate the
Fourth Amendment?
HOLDING
NO:
A parolee has a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment.
This allows suspicionless searches by police
officers.

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REASON
The Court stated that “examining the totality of the circumstances
pertaining to petitioner’s status as a parolee,” it is an established variation on
imprisonment.
Under the plain terms of the parole search condition, the
Court concluded that the petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy
that society would recognize as legitimate.

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Supreme Court of Louisiana.
STATE of Louisiana v. Mary L. TOUPS a/k/a Mary Billiot.
No. 2001-K-1875.
Decided: October 15, 2002
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Juliet L. Clark,
Terrytown, Counsel for Applicant. Kevin V. Boshea, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent.
We granted this writ to determine whether the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant’s
conviction for possession of cocaine, finding that the State failed to prove the element of
possession.
After reviewing the facts and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the
court of appeal and reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
After receiving confidential information that a person named “Stan” was selling drugs from a
residence at 633 North Scott Street and conducting a controlled purchase of drugs from that
address on the afternoon of October 18, 1999, on that evening, New Orleans Police Department
Officer Dennis Bush and five other officers executed a search warrant at that residence.
Before
executing the warrant, the officers conducted a surveillance of the residence for approximately
thirty minutes.
After receiving no response at the front door, Bush entered the shotgun
residence.
He observed defendant Mary Toups and Stanley Williams, the known resident of
that address, seated on a sofa in the front living room, facing one another and apparently engaged
in conversation.
1
Two pieces of crack cocaine, three clear glass crack pipes and a razor blade
were found on a coffee table positioned directly in front of defendant and Williams.
Defendant
was approximately three feet from the drugs on the table, which were directly in front of her.
Another 16 rocks of cocaine found at the home were located in a plastic container that was next
to Williams.
Police also seized $304.00 in cash from the same area.
The officers did not see
defendant or Williams smoking from the pipes.
The officers did not see defendant enter the
residence during their 30-minute surveillance, indicating she was in the residence for at least that
long, but were unable to find any indication that defendant resided there.
Defendant falsely
gave her name as “Mary Billiot” at the time of her arrest.
While defendant was not charged
with any offense with regard to the cocaine in the container, the State filed a bill of information
charging defendant with possession of the two pieces of cocaine found on the coffee table.
2
At trial, in addition to the above testimony, a criminologist with the New Orleans Police
Department Crime Laboratory testified that the rocks in the container, the two additional rocks,
and the pipes all tested positive for cocaine.
None of the items were submitted for fingerprint
analysis.

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Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of six and was sentenced as a multiple offender
to serve four years in the department of corrections.
On May 23, 2001, her conviction was
reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which found that the evidence introduced at trial
was constitutionally insufficient to support the conviction.
State v. Toups, 00-1944 (La.App. 4
Cir. 5/23/01), 792 So.2d 18.
We granted the State’s writ application.
State v. Toups, 01-1875
(La.5/24/02), 815 So.2d 851.
ISSUE
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court must
determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient
to convince a rational trier of fact that the State proved the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979).
Further, when the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438
provides that such evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
State v.
Camp, 446 So.2d 1207 (La.1984).
La. R.S. 15:438, however, does not establish a stricter
standard of review than the more general rational juror’s reasonable doubt formula; it is merely
an evidentiary guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence.
State v. Porretto,
468 So.2d 1142 (La.1985).
All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson
reasonable doubt standard.
State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La.1987).
Finally, the fact finder’s
discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental
protection of due process of law.
State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988).
A reviewing
court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La.1992).
REASONING
Toups was charged with possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967, which makes it
unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance.
The State need not prove that the defendant was in physical possession of the narcotics found;
constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.
The law on constructive
possession is as follows:
A person may be in constructive possession of a drug even though it is not in his physical
custody, if it is subject to his dominion and control.
Also, a person may be deemed to be in
joint possession of a drug which is in the physical custody of a companion, if he willfully and
knowingly shares with the other the right to control it
․
Guilty knowledge is an essential
ingredient of the crime of unlawful possession of an illegal drug
․
State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983) (citing State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 245 So.2d 327,
329 (1971)).
However, it is well settled that the mere presence in an area where drugs are
located or the mere association with one possessing drugs does not constitute constructive
possession.
State v. Harris, 94-0970 (La.12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337; State v. Bell, 566 So.2d 959
(La.1990).

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